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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LISA WATTERS,

)
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
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)
C. QUERRY, CHARLES L.
)
QUERRY, ELIZABETH HEMINGWAY,
)
and DAVID E. HEMINGWAY,
)
)
Defendants-Respondents. )

Case No. 16897

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This was a personal injury action by plaintiffappellant, Lisa Watters, against defendant-respondent Elizabeth
Hemingway, resulting from an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court and the jury
returned a verdict finding defendant Hemingway negligent.

This

negligence was not found to be a proximate cause of the accident,
however.

Defendant Clayton Querry was found to 100% at fault.

The jury awarded $115,000 general damages and $38,000 special
damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial court's
finding that defendant Hemingway's negligence was not a proximate
cause of the accident.

As an alternative, respondent asks for a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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new trial on the issue of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arises out of an accident which occurred
February 26, 1976.

The accident occurred at approximately 10:00

p.m. at 2910 South 7th East, Salt Lake County, Utah.

Visibility

was clear and the road condition was level and dry.
All of the parties involved in this dispute, respondent
Hemingway, defendant Querry, and appellant Watters, were driving
north on 7th East prior to the accident.

Respondent Hemingway

made a left turn from 7th East and subsequently defendant Querry
struck appellant's car from the rear.
In view of the respondent's favorable jury verdict, the
facts will be considered in the light most favorable to her on
this appeal.

On the date of the accident, respondent, Elizabeth

Hemingway, was 17 years old.

Respondent and her brother had been

engaged in dropping off two of her brother's friends in the
vicinity of 7th East.

Appellant, Lisa Watters, was 36 years old

at the time of the accident.

She was traveling on 7th East

enroute to her place of work.
The respondent entered 7th East from Elgin Avenue.

She

turned onto to 7th East proceeding from Elgin Avenue to the lane
next to the far left lane.

She then moved into the left hand

lane to make a left turn at the end of the island.
signaled her lane changes.

(TR. p. 201, L. 9-24)

She carefully
The movement

of respondent's car, as supported by witnesses' testimony, was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gradual and not sudden and unexpected.

(TR. p. 88, L. 27-29;

TR. p. 266, L. 12-19)

The respondent's vehicle did not come to a complete
stop.

(TR. p. 201, L. 14-19; p. 266, L. 3-11)

She merely slowed

down, waited for a southbound car to pass, and completed her
turn.

The appellant noticed the respondent's car while she was

still more than 160 yards away.

(TR. p. 111, L. 4-5)

The

appellant had a clear view of traffic and observed that respondent was traveling more slowly and had applied her brakes.
(TR. p. 112, L. 3-23)

Appellant attempted to change lanes but

could not complete the change because of traffic to the right of
her.

(TR. p. 113, L. 18-19)

By this time, appellant had moved

so close to respondent as to necessitate an abrupt, hard stop on
the part of appellant.

(TR. p. 113, L. 20-23)

Still, she was

able to avoid contact with the respondent's car.
At this time, the vehicle of defendant Querry was proceeding north in the left lane of traffic.

The undisputed facts

disclose that the defendant Querry, immediately prior to the
collision with appellant's vehicle, was engaged in conversation
with a passenger and, therefore, was not maintaining a proper
lookout.

He did not observe the sudden stop of appellant's car.

(TR. p. 216, L. 8-14, First Trial)

As respondent completed her turn around the island,
appellant began to pull away from the position where she had
stopped.

Defendant Querry then collided with appellant's

vehicle.

At this instant, respondent's car had completed her
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turn and was not a factor in the cause of the accident.

The

respondent pulled her car to the side of the road and asked if
anyone was hurt.

(TR. p. 204, L. 19-24)

Someone replied that

everyone was all right and the respondent proceeded home.

(TR.

p. 205, L. 9-15)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS PROPERLY
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
Respondent Hemingway was found negligent by the jury.
Yet, after viewing all of the facts, the jury found that this
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.

It is a

well-established law, that has been followed in Utah, that causation is a question for the jury and not a question of law.

The

court has the duty to define the law, but' the jury is the proper
body to apply the law to the facts of the case.
Even though proximate cause may at times be a difficult
question, the question should still be submitted to the jury.
is only at those times when reasonable minds could not differ,
that the question can be decided as a matter of law.
It has been said to be the general rule
that what is the proximate cause for an
injury is ordinarily a question for the
jury, the court instructing them as to
what the law requires to constitute it,
and the jury applying the law to the
facts. It is not a question of science
or of legal knowledge. It is to be
determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it. 57
Am.Jur.2d 487.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It

Negligence alone is not enough to make the negligence
actionable.

The negligence must also be shown to be the proxi-

mate cause of the injury.

Utah law has realized that a party may

be negligent and yet that negligence may not be a proximate cause

of the accident.

In Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9

Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959), the plaintiff's rifle exploded
while he was hunting.
manufacturing the gun.

He sued the defendant for negligence in
The jury found the issues in favor of the

plaintiff and the defendant appealed from that judgment.

The

defendant claimed that there was no evidence of its negligence
and that the only reasonable deduction to be drawn from the evidence was that the accident was a result of the plaintiff's own
negligence.

The plaintiff had altered the gun considerably and

the defendant alleged that this was the proximate cause of the
accident.

The defendant's expert said that the changes made by

the plaintiff were probably a factor in the accident.

The court

said:
If it is only 'probable' the jury would
not be required to find such to be the
fact; nor should it be so ruled as a
matter of law, because there is no basis
for saying the evidence preponderated
that way. 342 P.2d at 1100.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a question for
the jury as to whether the manufacturer was negligent, whether
that negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, and
whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
In the present case, there is only a possibility that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the respondent Hemingway's negligence could be found to be a
proximate cause of the injury.

The jury is not required to find

that the negligence was a proximate cause and it should not be so
ruled as a matter of law.
The majority of Utah cases insist that the issue of
proximate cause be submitted to the jury.

In Jensen v. Dolen, 12

Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962), the plaintiff and defendant
were involved in an automobile accident.

Plaintiff Jensen was a

passenger in a car which was struck in the rear by a car operated
by the defendant.

The car in which the plaintiff was a passenger

had stopped at a stop sign.

The defendant, sliding on a patch of

ice, collided with the stopped vehicle.

The defendant moved for

a directed verdict at the end of the evidence on the grounds that
there was no showing of negligence on the part of the defendant
and the ice on the highway was the sole proximate cause of the
accident.

In holding that jury issues were presented as to

whether the defendant was negligent and as to whether the accident would have happened in the absence of the negligence, the
court said:
Ordinarily, the issue of proximate cause
is a matter to be submitted to the jury
for its determination. *** Thus, this
issue, along with the question of
negligence, should have been submitted to
the jury. 367 P.2d at 193.
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated their position that
proximate cause was an issue to be decided by the jury in Nyman
v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961).

The plain-
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tiff was injured when the automobile in which she riding ran into
~ obstructions on a street in Cedar City.
1

The City was performing

some construction and they had failed to put up any barricades or
warning signs or lights to warn traffic of the obstructions.

The

court held that the evidence in this case did justify the
1

l findings that the City was negligent and that the negligence was

a proximate cause of the accident.
~:

mt

In making that decision, the

court said:
When the evidence is such that there is
doubt about whether one of two causes is
a proximate cause of an injury so that
the question could reasonably be found
either one way or the other, the question
is orie of fact for the court or jury.
361 P.2d at 1117.
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263
P.2d 287 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court once again held that
questions of whether the defendant was negligent and whether that
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident were for the

*

jury.

~

was riding crashed into the rear of defendant's truck which was

The plaintiff's son was killed when the car in which he

parked with its rear end protruding out on to the highway.

As

the car in which the plaintiff's decedent was riding approached
the negligently parked truck, it attempted to pass another
vehicle and when unable to do so, swung back into the right-hand
lane and collided with the parked truck.

The court stated that

the conduct of a later intervening actor in negligently failing
to observe a dangerous condition until it is too late to be
avoided raises a question of fact, to be determined by the jury,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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whether the later intervening acts supersedes the negligence of
the initial actor:
The second situation involves conduct of
a later intervening actor who negligently
failed to observe the dangerous condition
until it is too late to avoid it. ***
With respect to the second situation,
where the second actor fails to see the
danger in time to avoid it, it is held
that a jury question exists, based on the
rationale that it can reasonably be
anticipated that circumstances may arise
wherein others may not observe the
dangerous condition until too late to
escape it. 263 P.2d at 292.
Defendant Querry failed to see the danger in time to
avoid the accident.

Under Utah law, this is exactly the

situation that should be· submitted -to the jury.
In Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., et al.,
Utah, 16417 (April, 1980), the Utah Supreme Court once again held
that the evidence was not such that it could be said that
reasonable minds could not differ and hence a jury issue was
presented.

Mountain Bell was performing service work on

underground telephone lines and parked one of its vans in the
intersection.

There were signs placed before the van and the van

had its four-way flashers on, its headlights on, and two strobe
lights flashing.

The plaintiff brought this suit after he was

injured in an accident with an automobile driven by defendant
Gonzales who was making a left hand turn at the intersection.
The trial court awarded summary judgment for defendant Mountain
Bell, ruling as a matter of law that their negligence was not the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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proximate cause of injuries sustained by the plaintiff.

In

reversing that decision, the court stated:
We recognize at the outset that in
appropriate circumstances summary
judgment may be granted on the issue of
proximate cause. However, in a situation
involving independent intervening cause,
the primary issue is one of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent
conduct of a third person, and in this
case, that issue must be resolved by the
finder of fact.
In the previous appeal of this case, Watters v. Querry,
588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), the court also found that there was a
legitimate question that should be determined by the jury:
It appears to us that there is a legitimate question as to whether a jury could
reasonably find that defendant Hemingway,
in making the alleged abrupt stop, should
have foreseen that, in traffic such as
there was on that highway, some momentarily inattentive driver following her
would not be able to react and brake
quick enough to avoid collision with her
car or the car behind hers. 588 P.2d at
704.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
a new trial.

The decision did not, as a matter of law, decide

e1:

that defendant Hemingway's negligence was the proximate cause of

o~

the accident.

~

~

If the situation presented an obvious question of

law, the Supreme Court would have decided the matter on the prior
appeal.

Instead it decided that the issues presented did raise a

question for the jury and remanded the case for a new trial.
Once the jury has looked at the facts, weighed them, and
made their decision, the Supreme Court should not decide the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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question as a matter of law.

In Swartley v. Seattle School Dist.

No. 1, 421 P.2d 1009 (Wash. 1966), a junior high student died of
strangulation when some plywood fell on to him while he was in a
room which he had no permission to enter.

In holding that the

evidence, as to whether the rule requiring permission was a
safety rule, created a jury question, the court said:
In the light of all the facts and
circumstances, whether this was a safe
manner of storage of plywood and whether
the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence, became questions of fact for
the jury. Thus, the court could not rule
on it as a matter of law. 421 P.2d at
~1012.

The court also maintained that:
The negligence of appellant and the
contributory negligence of the deceased
was the primary questions for the jury;
they were questions of fact. Their final
resolution by the verdict of the jury
placed them beyond the province of this
court to determine otherwise. 421 P.2d
at 1013-1014.
In the present case, the issues of fact have been properly resolved by the jury and should not be disturbed by this
court.
In Wash-A-Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 (Utah,
1975), the plaintiff claimed that there had been a lease contract
formed and the defendant subsequently would not accept the
supplies.

Plaintiff claimed that this was a breach of the

contract and that the defendant was liable for damages.

The

trial judge found that there was no binding contract between the
plaintiff and defendant and that the plaintiff was not entitled
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to any damages.

In holding that the evidence was insufficient to

establish a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, the
supreme Court said:
The evidence was sufficient to sustain
the judgment made, and we should sustain
the trial court even if we might have
come to a different decision had we been
trying the matter. 582 P.2d at 683.
The Supreme Court of Utah again reiterated their stand
on appellate review in Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah,
1977).

The plaintiffs brought the action for breach of a written

contract for purchase of a clothing business.

The purchase

agreement provided for a down payment and equal monthly
installments.

The defendants took possession but subsequently

failed to make the equal monthly payments.

The plaintiff was to

pay all taxes prior to the transfer of the corporate stock but
failed to make these payments.

The trial court rendered a

judgment for the unpaid balance of the purchase price and defendants filed this appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the perfor-

mance by defendants was not excused because plaintiff was
disabiea from performance by her own inaction of not paying the
taxes.

The court, in discussing their duty of review, stated:
This Court has consistently followed the
well-recognized standard of appellate
review which precludes the substitution
of our judgment for that of the trial
court on issues of fact, and where its
findings and judgment are based on
substantial, competent, admissible evidence we will not disturb them. 572 P.2d
at 394.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The jury is the correct party to make the conclusions of
fact after hearing the evidence.

The Supreme Court should not

disturb the findings unless clearly against the weight of
evidence.

In this case, two different juries have made the same

finding, indicating that that finding is supported by the
evidence.
Jury Instruction No. 24, given by the court, was the
instruction approved by the Supreme Court in the prior appeal of
this case.

The court said that the difficulty with the previous

instruction given was that it seemed to exculpate defendant
Hemingway if it was found that defendant Querry was negligent,
whether or not the latter's conduct was foreseeable.

Jury

Instruction No. 24 (Annex 9) corrects this defect by stating that
if the actions of Elizqbeth Hemingway were found wrongful and the
collision of defendant Querry's car with that of appellant
Watters was "within the natural and continuous sequence of events
which might reasonably be expected to follow the actions of
defendant Hemingway," then defendant Hemingway could be found a
proximate cause of the injury.

Appellant now claims that this

instruction was too difficult to be submitted to a jury, yet the
instruction is consistent with the law and had been approved for
the jury in the previous appeal for this particular accident.
Proximate cause is a jury issue and should only be
decided as a matter of law when reasonable people could not
differ.

As shown by Utah precedent, proximate cause is almost

always a jury question.

The Supreme Court should not disturb
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this finding after it was properly decided by the jury.
POIN~

II.

THE NEGLIGENT ACT OF THE LATER ACTOR,
-DEFENDANT QUERRY, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

An actor may possibly be negligent and create a potentially dangerous situation, yet the actor is not liable for every
result which occurs because of his negligence.

The initial actor

is not the proximate cause of an accident if they have created a
situation which is harmless unless acted upon by a force for which
they are not responsible.

A later actor's conduct can be found

to be a subsequent intervening act when their conduct makes a
harmless situation injurious.

In the present case, respondent

Hemingway's conduct did not proximately contribute to the injury.
Respondent Hemingway had completed her maneuver and appellant
Watters had stopped.

Without defendant Querry's subsequent inter-

vening negligence, his inattentiveness and improper lookout, no

I

injury would have resulted.
In Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d
128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970}, the defendant had negligently parked his

truck on the highway.

The plaintiff was injured when the car in

which he was riding, due to negligence on the part of the driver,
collided with the parked truck.

While observing that the cement

truck created a dangerous condition, the Utah Supreme Court
pointed out that the accident occurred in broad daylight on a
clear day where there was nothing to obstruct the vision or

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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distract the attention of the plaintiff's driver before colliding
with the truck.

The court then stated:

Where one has negligently created a
dangerous condition • • • if the previously created dangerous condition is
such that the later actor, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
observed and avoided it, in which instant
the later act of negligence is an independent intervening and therefore sole
proximate cause. 467 P.2d at 46.
The Supreme Court held that the negligence of the driver was the
sole proximate cause of the collision and the plaintiff was
precluded from recovering from the owner of the truck.
In McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959), three large trailer-trucks had stopped along the highway.
Unit No. 1 had developed difficuties and had stopped to make
repairs.

Unit No. 2, driven by respondent, stopped in front of

Unit No. 1 and the driver returned to give assistance.

Unit No. 3,

driven by another defendant, parked on the pavement with all of
its lights on.

The appellant approached the situation, and

observing Unit No. 2 blocking the road, stopped and waited for
the oncoming traffic to clear.

While parked in this position,

appellant noticed a speeding truck approaching in his rearview
mirror.

The truck collided with the appellant's car.

The driver

of the pickup truck was found negligent as a matter of law and
settled prior to trial.

The trial court returned a judgment in

favor of the other defendants and the plaintiffs appealed.

The

plaintiff argued that there was error in the instructions given
to the jury.

The jury instruction was as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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You are instructed that the driver of the
pickup truck was negligent as a matter of
law, and if you find that she observed
the hazards if any of the stopped
vehicles upon the highway or under the
circumstances should have observed said
vehicles, but because of her negligence
failed to do so in time to avoid said
accident, then you are instructed that
the negligence on her part was the sole
proximate cause of the collision, and
your verdict must be in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs, no
cause of action. 346 P.2d at 712.
The court maintained that the issue had been rightfully submitted
to the jury and that the pickup driver's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the collision.
In the present case, exercise of reasonable care on the
part of defendant Querry would have enabled him to avoid the
accident.

Due to Querry's negligence and inattentiveness, he

failed to observe the situation as he should have.

Therefore,

his later negligent act became the sole proximate cause of the
collision.
It was not probable that defendant Querry would be inattentive and hit appellant Watters' automobile.

A person need not

be responsible for all possible consequences of a negligent act
as illustrated in Stevenson v. Kansas City, 360 P.2d 1 (Kan.
1961).

The plaintiff was injured by a person who attacked and

beat her while she was going to a restroom in defendant's
building.

The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's negligence,

which was the proximate cause of her injury and damage, consisted
of the failure to provide and furnish her with a safe place to
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attend the performance, to provide and maintain proper and sufficient police and guards near the door where the assault
occurred, and their failure to have ramps sufficiently lighted.
The court looked at the questions of whether there was any negligence on the part of the defendant and whether that negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

In holding

that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was not a proximate
cause of the injuries, the court said:
A person is not charged with all possible
consequences of his negligent acts. He
is not responsible for a consequence
which is merely possible according to
occasional experience, but only for those
consequences which are probable according
to ordinary and usual experience. 360
P.2d at 3-4.
The court also maintained that:
Negligence is not the proximate cause of
an accident unless, under the
circumstances, the accident was a probable as well as an actual consequence
thereof • • • • 360 P.2d at 4.
In the present case, respondent Hemingway should not
have to guard against every possible consequence of her
negligence.

She should only be responsible for those occurrences

which are a probable result of her actions.

It is not probable

that a following driver will be so inattentive that he will fail
to see a dangerous situation ahead of him.
The negligence of respondent Hemingway was not a proximate cause of the injury.
decision.

Two juries have returned this same

There are other cases where this same conclusion has
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also been reached.

In King v. Ellis, 350 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1962),

a suit was brought for personal injuries resulting from a
collision of two automobiles, alleged to have been caused by the
defendant's negligent operation of a third automobile.
Ellis was driving the lead vehicle.
driven by the plaintiff.

Defendant

The second vehicle was being

All of the vehicles were being operated

in the lane next to the center line.

The defendant turned to his

left in front of the plaintiff, made a "U" turn and headed back
on the other side of the highway.

The plaintiff saw the

defendant, applied her brakes and slowed down or stopped so that
she did not make contact with the defendant's truck.

A car

following the plaintiff saw the situation and tried to apply his
brakes but the brake line failed.
with the plaintiff before trial.

The subsequent driver settled
At trial, the plaintiff

testified that the defendant's truck was traveling very slowly
when she first saw it just a little while before her car was
struck.

She also claimed that she did not see the defendant give

any signal.

The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the

defendant and the plaintiff appealed.

The defendant contended

that the sole and independent cause of the collision and

•

plaintiff's injuries was the failure of the brakes on the

1

following automobile.

He also contended that the neligence on

the part of the defendant was not the legal and proximate cause
of the collision between the automobiles.

Th~

court held that

the erratic and negligent operation of the defendant's pickup
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truck was not a proximate cause of injuries to a following
plaintiff motorist who was able to stop and avoid contact with
the truck but who was injured when the rear end of her automobile
was struck by the second following automobile whose brake line
failed when that driver attempted to stop.

In making this

decision, the court stated that if the subsequent driver's brakes
had not failed, the plaintiff would not have been injured.
The court stated:
Without the sudden and unexpected failure
of the brakes on the Rayburn car in the
present case, the collision would not
have occurred. On the record before us
the brake failure was an efficient,
intervening cause and the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries. 359 S.W.2d
at 689.
The court, in citing another case with approval, also felt that:
The negligence of the driver of the third
or last car was the proximate cause of
the collision and plaintiff's injuries
and that the alleged negligence of the
driver of the first car was too remote to
be causative in the legal sense. 359
S.W.2d at 688.
In Viator v. Gilbert, 206 So.2d 106, (La.App. 1968), the
suit arose as a result of a four-car collision on a Louisiana
highway.

All the vehicles were proceeding in the same direction.

The driver of the first car was intoxicated and attempted to make
a "U" turn in the left lane of the highway at what he erroneously
thought was a crossing in the neutral ground.

His car stalled

with the rear portion extending into the left lane of traffic.
The driver of the second automobile brought his car to a gradual
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stop behind the first car.

About 30 or 40 seconds later, the

second driver was hit in the rear by a car driven by Mr. Gilbert.
The trial court found that the first driver was negligent but
that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.

Mr. Gilbert was found negligent and his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Also, a subsequent driver involved in

the collision was found to be a proximate cause.

The trial court

entered judgment for the plaintiff against certain of the defendants and those defendants appealed.

On appeal, the court looked

at the question of whether the negligence of the first driver was
a proximate cause of the accident.

In making their decision, the

court stated:
While there can be no doubt of Mr.
Wilkinson's negligence, it is undisputed
that Mr. Provost was able to come to a
gradual stop behind him and avoid a
collision, and that all of the impacts
occurred after this stopping. When the
lead vehicle makes a sudden stop, or one
in order to execute an illegal maneuver,
but the operator of a second vehicle is
able to bring his car to a stop without a
collision, the first driver is not liable
if a third vehicle collides with the
second.* * * We find, therefore, that the
jury was correct in concluding that Mr.
Wilkinson's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. 206 So.2d at
109.

In the present case, defendant Hemingway was negligent,
as decided by the jury, but that negligence was not the proximate
cause of the injury.

The subsequent negligence of defendant

Querry was an intervening cause and as such, the sole proximate
cause of the collision.

Without defendant Querry's
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inattentiveness, the collision would not have occurred.
Defendant Hemingway's negligence was too remote to be causative
in a legal sense.
This case has been tried twice before a jury.

The same

conclusion, that defendant Hemingway was negligent but that the
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident, was
reached in both trials.

At the second trial, testimony that

defendant Hemingway had stated that she "felt like she caused an
accident" was allowed to be admitted into evidence.

Yet, with

the new jury and the admission of the additional evidence, the
same result was reached.

Defendant Hemingway's negLigence was

not a proximate cause of the accident.
POINT III.
APPELLANT'S THEORY OF THE CASE WAS
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
A new trial should be granted only when it is found that
there was an error and that the error was prejudicial.
Appellant claims that her theory of the case was not
submitted to the jury.

These theories were set forth in Jury

Instructions No. 17 and 17A of appellant's Requested
Instructions.

However, these instructions were effectively given

by other instructions.

The court cannot be said to have failed

to properly instruct the jury when their Requested Instructions
were fully covered in other instructions given.

Jensen v.

Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P.2d 838 (1954).
The appellant's proposed Instruction 17 (Annex 1) is
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couched in terms of a general verdict.
mitted on a general verdict theory.

This case was not sub-

The court's instruction to

the jury, No. 37 (Annex 2), states:
This case is not submitted to you for the
rendition of a general verdict as is
sometimes done, but it is your function
herein to make findings of fact as to
special interrogatories or questions
which are herewith submitted to you.
It would have been improper to submit this instruction to the
jury and, therefore, it was properly left out of the submitted
instructions.
Appellant's proposed Instruction 17A (Annex 3), along
with proposed Instruction No. 17, was given to the jury in other
instructions.

Instruction 17 claims three acts of negligence on

the part of the plaintiff.

Those acts were an illegal left turn

which blocked traffic, an improper lookout and failure to drive

™ as a reasonable driver would.

Instruction 17A merely repeated

the duty to maintain a proper lookout and to drive reasonably.
The court's Instruction No. 18 (Annex 4) instructed the jury that
if they found that the driver had conducted herself in violation
of the applicable statute, that she would be negligent as a

~

matter of law.

The statute stated that it was unlawful to make a

~

"U" turn except in designated areas.

The jury was given

instruction No. 19 (Annex 5), that provided that the law required
that a person should not turn their vehicle upon a public highway
unless such movement could be made with reasonable safety.

The

court's Instruction No. 25 (Annex 6) gives the instructions of
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the duty to maintain a lookout and to drive reasonably as
requested by the appellant.
lookout must be kept.

No. 25A tells the jury that a proper

No. 25B explains that cars must be kept

under reasonably safe and proper control.

The jury could, from

these instructions, easily decide that if a driver blocked a
highway and this action was unreasonable, the driver would be
negligent.

There was no instruction given about the duty to

maintain a constant lookout for following traffic because the
duty to keep a proper lookout applies to all surrounding traffic,
not merely to following vehicles.
The appellant's theory of the case was adequately given
to the jury.

Repetition of these instructions would only have

erroneously emphasized these points of the case.
POINT IV.
THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT A LATER ACT OF NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE.
The instructions given to the jury were not incorrect
statements of the law.

Instruction 7D (Annex 7) states:

By 'proximate' cause is meant that cause
which in a natural, continuous sequence,
unbroken by any new cause, produced the
injury and without which the injury would
not have occurred.
The jury should be informed that a subsequent intervening act can
break the chain of events and thereby relieve the initial negligent actor from any liability.

The subsequent intervening act

then becomes the sole proximate cause.

Without this instruction,
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the first negligent actor would be unduly held liable for all
possible consequences resulting from his act.
is not erroneous.

This instruction

It is a correct statement of the law.

Jury Instruction No. 17 (Annex 8) gives further clarification to Instruction No. 7D.

It does gives a definition of

efficient cause as the "one that necessarily sets in operation
the factors that accomplish the injury."

It then further

explains that there can be more than one proximate cause.

This

instruction is necessary and does not add any complications to
the idea of proximate cause.
By appellant's own admission, defendant Querry was the
efficient

~ntervenin~

cause.

efficient intervening cause."

"Mr. Querry was exactly that--an
(Appellant's Brief, p. 27)

Defendant Querry was, by being the efficient intervening cause,
the one who set in operation the factors that accomplished the
injury.
There is no error and confusion created by giving both
Instruction 17 and 7D.

Instruction 7D uses the phrase "unbroken

by any new cause" and Instruction 17 uses the phrase "unbroken by
an efficient intervening cause."

As explained by the

instructions, these instructions are correct because an efficient
~

cause sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury
and this would be a new cause.

Instruction No. 24 (Annex 9) just

continues to elaborate on these concepts along with the other
correct instructions.
These instructions are the approved instructions for the
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question of proximate cause.

Instructions 17 and 7D are correct

statements of the law and are approved in JIFU.
No. 24 elaborates on these approved instructions.

Instruction
It gives defi-

nitions of proximate cause specifically applicable to this
accident.
POINT V.
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT WAS ALLOWED TO
SEE AND TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S
INSTRUCTIONS.
Counsel for appellant claims that he was not afforded an
opportunity to see the instructions prior to their submission to
the jury.

Yet, when he excepted to the failure of the court to
.

-

give some of appellant's instructions, he said:
The Court has in Chambers stated its
reasons as being that he would follow the
instructions given by Judge Snow in the
previous trial, contrary to my urgency
that having a second opportunity to try
the case, that we should make it as much
better as possible.
Specifically, Instructions 7 and 17-A are
plaintiff's proposed instructions dealing
with their claims of negligence on the
part of defendant Hemingway. 17 states
the claims. 17-A defines the defendant's
instruction, setting out the claim.
(TR.
p. 320, L. 19-29)
This indicates that there was a discussion in Chambers.
At that time, it was decided that the instructions that were
given by Judge Snow would be followed.

Mr. King stated that he

excepted to the failure to give certain instructions and the
reasons were discussed in Chambers.

-24-

Then Mr. King points out the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

instructions he is talking about are those that purportedly convey the plaintiff's theory of liability.

This indicates that the

discussion in Chambers included a discussion about the issue of
liability.
Mr. King brought up the discussion in chambers several
more times during the course of the trial.
discussion in chambers.

He admits there was a

(TR. p. 311, L. 25-30)

He claims, in

his affidavit, that the discussion was only about damages.

Yet,

he said that after working with the court on the instructions, he
spent a half hour trying to work out a map.

(TR. p. 317, L. 3-5)

If the discussion had been merely about damages, there would have
been no necessity to work out a map which would have been used to
convey the liability issues to the jury.
From these statements, it appears that Mr. King was present at a discussion in Chambers and that the discussion focused
around the instructions to be given to the jury, including those
on liability, prior to the court instructing the jury.
CONCLUSION
Proximate cause is, in all but the exceptional cases, an
issue for the jury.

The question was properly submitted to the

jury to allow them to apply the applicable law to the facts.
Defendant Querry's negligence was an efficient intervening cause
and, as such, the sole proximate cause of the collision.

The

appellant's theory of the case was submitted to the jury and the
instructions were not conflicting.
were accurate statements of the law.

They had been approved and
Counsel for appellant was
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afforded an opportunity to discuss the proposed instructions
before they were given to the jury.

A new trial on the issue of

liability should not be granted because appellant is disappointed
in the result of his second attempt to convince a jury that
defendant Hemingway's negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision.
Dated this 26th day of June, 1980.

F S

for Defendantt Hemingway
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Respondents' Brief to Samuel King, Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant, 301 Gump & Ayers Building, 2120 South 1300 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, and to Gary A. Frank, Attorney for
Respondents Hemingway, 5085 South State Street, Murray, Utah
84107, this 26th day of June, 1980.
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~

APPELLANT'S PROPOSED
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
Plaintiff claims that Elizabeth Hemingway was negligent
because she obstructed a moving lane of traffic.

Plaintiff

claims that this negligence was of three types which are:

(1)

that she attempted an illegal left turn thereby blocking arterial
traffic; (2) that she kept an improper lookout, so that she
failed to clear the road as oncoming traffic approached; (3) that
she failed to drive as a reasonable driver would have and should
have under the

exi~ting

circQmstances.
~

If you find that Elizabeth Hemingway was negligent in
one or more of the above particulars, and if you further find
that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, then
you are to render verdict for plaintiff against Elizabeth
Hemingway, and award plaintiff damages.

If you do not so find,

then you are to enter verdict in favor of Elizabeth Hemingway and
against plaintiff.

\

\

. I

ANNEX 1
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37
This case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a
general verdict as is sometimes done, but it is your function
herein to make findings of fact as to special interrogatories or
questions which are herewith submitted to you.

In making your

findings of fact you should bear in mind that the burden of
proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming that fact
to be true, and he must prove it by a preponderance of the
evidence.

Before you may answer "yes" to any question submitted

to you you must find the same to be true by a preponderance of
the evidence.

It requires the agreement of six, (three-fourths),

of the jurors to answer any question, and at least six of the
jurors must agree that the answer to the question should be "yes"
before such answer may be made.
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ANNEX 2

APPELLANT'S PROPOSED
INSTRUCTION NO. 17A
Lookout.

It is the duty of a driver to keep a reason-

able lookout for other traffic.

If a driver causes a collision,

which the driver could reasonably have averted due to the
driver's not keeping a reasonable lookout, such is negligence.
Reasonable driving.

A driver has a duty to drive

safely, to avoid creating hazards, and to be aware of other
traffic.

If a driver fails to so drive as a reasonable driver

would under the existing circumstances, such is negligence.
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ANNEX 3

INSTRUCTION NO. 18

If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that a
driver conducted herself in violation of the following statute
which is proposed for the safety of-others, such conduct would
constitute negligence as a matter of law, unless excused as
explained in the last paragraph below.
The statute is, in pertinent parts, as follows:
Whenever a highway has been divided into
two separate roadways by a dividing
section, it shall be unlawful to drive
any vehicle upon any such highway except
to the right of such dividing section, or
to drive any vehicle over, upon, or
across any such dividing section or to
make any left turn or semicircular or uturn on any such divided highway, except
through a plainly marked opening in such
dividing section designed and designated
for such left turn, semicircular or
U-turn, unless a sign or signs authorized
and displayed by the state road commission or other governmental agency
shall otherwise indicate.
While the above rule is generally true, it is not absolute under all circumstances.

It may be overcome by evidence

showing that under all the surrounding circumstances the conduct
in question was in conformity with the standard of care a reasonable and prudent person would have observed under like
circumstances.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19
The law requires that no person shall turn a vehicle
upon a public highway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety.

This does not mean, however, that the

driver of a motor vehicle, before making -a turn, must know that
there is no possibility of accident.

It means that before

starting to turn a vehicle and while making the turn, the driver
of the vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy a

reasonably prudent person, acting under similar circumstances,
that the turn could be made safely.
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ANNEX 5

INSTRUCTION NO. 25
It was the duty of the drivers to use reasonable care
under the circumstances in driving their cars to avoid danger to
themselves and others and to observe and be aware of the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other existing
conditions; in that regard, they were obliged to observe due care
in respect to:
A.

Use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other

vehicles or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
B.

Keep their cars under reasonably safe and proper

c.

Not to follow another vehicle more closely than is

control.

reasonable and prudent, having due regard for their own speed,
the speed of such other vehicle, other traffic upon the highway,
and all other conditions there existing, and to keep at such a
distance and maintain such control of their automobiles as is
reasonable and prudent for the safety of- themselves and others.
Failure of the drivers to operate their automobiles in
accordance with the foregoing requirements of the law would
constitute negligence on their part.
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ANNEX 6

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
The terms "negligence," "contributory negligence,"
"ordinary care," and "proximate cause," as used in these
instructions, are defined as follows:
A.

"Negligence" means the failure to do what a reason-

ably prudent person would have done under the circumstances of
the situation, or doing what such person under such existing circumtances would not have done •. The essence of the fault may lie
in acting or omitting to act.

The duty is dictated and measured

by the exigencies of the occasion;
B.

"Contributory negligence" means that a person

injured has proximately contributed to such injury by·his want of
ordinary care, so that except for such want of ordinary care on
his part the injury would not have resulted;

c.

"Ordinary care" is that degree of care which a

reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar
circumstances.

"Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reason-

able diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight as
under all the circumstances of the particular case would be exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person;
D.

By "proximate cause" is meant that cause which in a

natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produced
the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.
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ANNEX 7

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.

It is the efficient cause--the one that

necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury.
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proximate cause of injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, or
the conduct of only one person.

To the contrary, the acts and

omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the
efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each of the
participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate
cause and both may be held responsible.
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ANNEX 8

INSTRUCTION NO. 24
You are instructed that a circumstance or act can
reasonably be regarded as the effective factor in producing an
injury and can be properly regarded as a proximate cause of it,
even though later events which combine to cause the injury may
also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is
something that might reasonably be expected to follow in the
natural sequence of events.

Thus, if you find that the actions

of Elizabeth Hemmingway were wrongful and that the collision of
Clayton Querry's car with that of Lisa Watter was within that
natural and continuous sequence of events which might reasonably
be expected to follow the actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway, and
result in the injury to Lisa Watters, then you may find that the
actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway were a concurring proximate cause
of the injury even though the later negligent act of Clayton
Querry cooperated to cause it.
But, if the actions of Clayton Querry in causing the
collision were of such character as not reasonably to be expected
to happen in the natural sequence of events started by the
actions of Elizabeth Hemmingway, then tne acts of Clayton Querry
are the independent intervening cause and, therefore, the sole
proximate cause of the injury.
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ANNEX 9

